© 2001 Lang Baker
Ex parte RussellNovember 14, 2001No. 74,101 Majority opinion Per Curiam Link to Dissenting opinion by Judge Womack IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. 74,101 EX PARTE CLYDE LEE RUSSELL, Applicant ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FROM TARRANT COUNTY Delivered per curiam. Womack, J., filed a dissenting opinion. O P I N I O N Applicant has filed a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Art. 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. He was convicted of possession of cocaine, and after his community supervision was revoked, his punishment was assessed at five years confinement. No appeal was taken from this conviction. After applicant was released on mandatory supervision, he filed the instant application, contending that his mandatory supervision would have already expired, had he received credit for all the time that he was confined in this cause on parole violator warrants. In 1999, the legislature instructed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to develop a system that allows resolution of a complaint by an inmate who alleges that time credited on the inmates sentence is in error and does not accurately reflect the amount of time-served credit to which the inmate is entitled. Tex. Govt Code §501.0081(a). For time-credit claims made on or after January 1, 2000, the statute requires that, unless certain criteria are met, such claims must initially be brought before the system described above, rather than through an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, §501.0081(b) of the Texas Government Code states:
Section 501.0081(c) states:
Applicant was released on mandatory supervision on April 21, 1999, more than a year before this writ application was filed with the district clerk on May 31, 2000. He was returned to the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division on January 31, 2001, with credit from November 30, 2000. When interpreting a statute, we look to the literal text of the statute for its meaning, and we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We go beyond the literal language of the statute only when the plain language of [the] statute would lead to absurd results, or if the language is not plain but rather ambiguous. Id. at 785-86. Chapter 501 of the Government Code does not specifically define inmate. Other legislative provisions tend to limit the definition to one who is housed in or confined to a correctional facility,1 although at least one provision includes in its definition of inmate one who is an administrative releasee.2 Given the absence of a specific definition of inmate in Chapter 501 and the general legal definition of that term as referring to a person confined to a prison, penitentiary, or the like,3 we hold that, once a person is released on mandatory supervision, he is not an inmate for purposes §501.0081. Therefore, because applicant had already been released on mandatory supervision when he filed the instant writ application, he was not subject to the restrictions of § 501.0081.4 Applicant contends that he has not received credit on this sentence for time that he was confined as a parole violator. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice, institutional and pardons and paroles divisions, have submitted affidavits and records reflecting that applicant was confined on a parole violator warrant from February 27, 1997, to August 13, 1997, and has not received credit for that period of confinement. Applicant is entitled to relief. Ex parte Price, 922 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Relief is granted. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice, institutional division, shall credit the sentence in cause number 339073-D in the 213th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County for the additional period of February 27, 1997, to August 13, 1997. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, institutional and paroles divisions. Per Curiam Date Delivered: November 14, 2001 Publish This information is made available as a free public service for your personal, non-commercial use. While every effort has been made to provide accurate material at this site, it is provided "as is" and no representations are made that it is free of mistakes or inaccuracies. This file was derived from the text posted on the web site of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, by the automatic operation of conversion software, and may contain errors. Baker's Legal Pages are a public service of Freelance Enterprises, Inc.
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