Keasler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Meyers, Mansfield, Price, and Johnson, J.J., joined. Meyers, J., delivered a concurring opinion. Keller, J., delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Holland, J., joined. Womack, J., delivered a dissenting opinion, in which McCormick, P.J., joined.

Whiteside filed his fourth application for a writ of habeas corpus after we disposed of his first three applications. Although his first application attacked the merits of his conviction, this fourth application raises a time-credit claim. We must decide whether the statutory bar on multiple writ applications applies to this case, given that we have recognized a limited exception to that bar for applications which do not attack the merits of the conviction. We conclude that this application is not barred by the statute. We will grant the requested relief.

We denied Whiteside’s initial habeas application in 1980. Whiteside filed additional applications in 1995 and 1997. The 1995 application was dismissed under the statutory bar. The 1997 application was addressed on its merits and denied without written order.

In this fourth application, Whiteside argues that he has been denied credit on his sentence for time that he was incarcerated in 1989 pursuant to a parole pre-revocation “blue” warrant.¹ The trial court initially recommended dismissing this application, but we remanded the application for findings of fact. Now the trial court finds, and the record reflects, that Whiteside was in custody in 1989 and has not received credit for this time. So, on the merits, Whiteside is entitled to habeas relief.

This is not Whiteside’s first application. Because the language of Article 11.07, § 4, is crucial to the resolution of this issue, we set forth the relevant language verbatim:

(a) If a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus is filed after final disposition of an initial application challenging the same conviction, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that:
(1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in an original application or in a previously considered application filed under this article because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application . . .²

Under the statute, this fourth writ application could be considered a “subsequent application.” It was filed in the trial court on October 9, 1997, which is “after final disposition” of Whiteside’s third application, denied by us on August 27, 1997.

In Ex parte Evans³, we held that not every application is a “challenge to the conviction” under § 4. We recognized that some claims, such as claims regarding parole revocations, do not challenge the judgment or sentence and, as a result, do not “challenge the conviction.”⁴ We noted that § 4 requires by its language that there be an “initial application challenging the conviction.”⁵ Since the applicant’s first application in that case pertained to his parole revocation, we concluded that his initial application did not “challenge the conviction.” So we held his second application was not barred and we addressed its merits.

This case is different. In this case, it is undisputed that Whiteside’s initial application did “challenge the conviction.” It is his subsequent application that does not. We must decide whether the statute requires that the subsequent application be a challenge to the conviction in order for it to apply.

The starting point in analyzing the meaning of a statute is the statutory language.⁶ When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of its words.⁷ On the other hand, when the words are ambiguous, or the plain meaning of the words would lead to an absurd result which the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we look to extratextual factors to ascertain the statute's meaning.⁸ Some of these factors include the:

(1) object sought to be attained;
(2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
(3) legislative history;
(4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects;
(5) consequences of a particular construction;
(6) administrative construction of the statute; and
(7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.⁹

Section 4 could be reasonably interpreted in two ways. It could be that, only the initial application must be a “challenge to the conviction” for the bar to apply. Support for this conclusion is the fact that the phrase “challenging the same conviction” is immediately after the phrase “initial application” and not near the phrase “subsequent application.” This is how the dissent interprets the statute. On the other hand, it could be that the subsequent application must also be a “challenge to the conviction.” Support for this theory is in the fact that the statute is worded “challenging the same conviction” as opposed to just “challenging the conviction.” The insertion of the word same is not necessary if the phrase is only referring to the initial application. The word same implies that the subsequent application is also attacking that same conviction. Both of these interpretations are possible, so we believe the phrasing of the statute is ambiguous.

We therefore examine the extratextual sources to resolve the issue. We consider the first three factors together: the object sought to be attained by the statute, the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, and the legislative history. We examined these factors in Ex parte Torres¹⁰, where we considered the meaning of another phrase in § 4. We noted that the comments of Senator Gallegos during the hearings indicated that the purpose of § 4 was to limit a convicted person to “one bite at the apple”:

And we tell individuals that, everything that you can possibly raise the first time, we expect you to raise it initially, one bite of the apple, one shot....[Answering questions]. I think we’ll have less filed, because what we’re attempting to do here is to say, raise everything at one time. You get one bite of the apple. If you have to stick the kitchen sink in there, put it all in there. And, we will go through those claims, one at a time, and make a decision, but none of this, one--one--every week you file a new petition which is currently basically what happens.¹¹

The goal of § 4, then, was to require inmates to include all their claims in one application, rather than filing many separate applications. We have reviewed the legislative history again, and we recognize that the legislators did not specifically discuss the difference between claims which challenge the conviction (ineffective assistance of counsel, involuntary plea, illegal sentence, for example) and claims which do not (parole revocations, time credits, for example). But they did seem to focus on claims which challenge the conviction. In response to one question, Senator Gallego answered as follows:

What I believe that this does is that it preserves everybody, everybody’s rights. As you sit there in trial, you know whether your Miranda rights were read or not. You know whether your attorney is doing a good job or not. You know whether you have an alibi or you don’t have an alibi. All of these claims that can be raised in habeas are things that you know really from the inception.¹²

These comments provide some indication that, at the time of the statute’s enactment, the legislators were only considering applications raising claims which challenge the conviction, whether it be the initial application or the subsequent application.

Next we consider the consequences of a particular construction. This factor is, in this case, the most important in our analysis. Initially, certain consequences are obvious. If we construe the statute to require that the subsequent application be a challenge to the conviction in order for § 4 to apply, we will be able to consider the merits of the instant application and grant Whiteside relief. On the other hand, if we construe § 4 to apply whenever the initial application challenges the conviction, it will apply in this case. We will be unable to consider the merits of Whiteside’s application and he will not get the time credits to which he is entitled. Significantly, he will have no other way in which to obtain relief. A nunc pro tunc judgment is not possible since the time in custody occurred after judgment was entered, and mandamus has not been viewed by this Court as an acceptable forum for time-credit claims.

But whether Whiteside gets relief or not is, frankly, a minor consequence compared to the impact our decision will have on habeas law in general. First we consider the consequences of construing § 4 narrowly, to require both the initial application and the subsequent application to challenge the conviction before the statute applies. It could be argued that this construction would encourage applicants to file multiple applications, the very evil that § 4 intends to prevent. Under this theory, inmates will file one application after the next, knowing that they can file as many as they like as long as their claims are not challenges to the conviction.

We believe this is an unlikely result for two reasons. First, there are not an unlimited number of claims which easily fall within the category of “non-challenges to the conviction.” We have recognized that parole revocations and time-credit claims fall within this category; there may be others as well. But there do not appear to be vast numbers of claims in this category. Conversely, claims which “challenge the conviction” are too numerous to count, since virtually anything that could possibly happen pertaining to a defendant’s arrest, representation, trial, and sentencing could be raised.

Second, we recognize that, regardless of the applicability of § 4 to any given case, we still retain our common-law power to cite an applicant for abuse of the writ.¹³ Nothing in § 4 interferes with this power. So if an applicant were to file multiple applications raising identical claims pertaining to the same parole revocation, we could cite that inmate for abuse of the writ, even if § 4 did not apply.

Another consequence of this construction is that inmates would be encouraged to separate their non-conviction attacks from their conviction attacks, even if both were available at the same time. Initially, this seems to go against the goal of § 4 to, as Senator Gallegos put it, “stick the kitchen sink in there.” But Senator Gallegos referred particularly to claims regarding the trial, and the “kitchen sink”adage makes sense in this context. It is logical to require an applicant who is challenging the validity of his trial to raise every possible claim pertaining to his trial in a single application. With non-conviction attacks, however, the “kitchen sink” adage loses meaning. To require an inmate to combine in a single application multiple time-credit claims from different time periods and multiple parole revocation claims from other time periods is like putting in the kitchen sink, the refrigerator, and the dishwasher. It becomes unwieldy and burdensome, both for the applicant and for the Court. Allowing inmates to put separate non-conviction-attacks in separate applications encourages the clear presentation of claims.

There is a final consequence to each construction which we must acknowledge. We cannot ignore that this Court faces an ever-increasing number of writ applications each year. The fact is that a decision limiting section four’s applicability will increase the workload of this Court, while a decision expanding section four’s applicability will decrease our workload. But, while relevant to us, we cannot believe that this is a consequence which we are supposed to consider.

We conclude, considering the legislative history, the purpose of the statute, and the consequences of each construction, that the subsequent application also must be a “challenge to the conviction” under Evans in order for § 4 to apply.

The trial court finds, and the record reflects, that Whiteside was incarcerated pursuant to a blue warrant from January 31, 1989, to April 3, 1989, but has not received credit for that time period. He is entitled to relief.

Relief is granted. The appropriate authorities at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, are ordered to grant Whiteside credit for the time period from

January 31, 1989, to April 3, 1989. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Paroles Division, and Board of Pardons and Paroles Division.

DATE DELIVERED: June 16, 1999

PUBLISH
¹ See Ex parte Canada, 754 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
² Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, § 4 (Vernon 1999).
³ 964 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
⁴ Id. at 647.
⁵ Id. at 646-47.
⁶ Brown v. State, 943 S.W.2d 35, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
⁷ Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998).
¹⁰ 943 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
¹¹ Id. at 474.
¹² House floor, S.B. 440, May 18, 1995, Tape 166, Side A.
¹³ See Ex parte Dora, 548 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).