Price, J., delivered a concurring opinion in which Johnson, J. joined.

I join the opinion of the Court but write separately regarding point of error eight. Nothing in the literal text of Article 35.16 indicates that the legislature intended the list of challenges for cause be an exclusive one. See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Trial courts have the discretionary power to dismiss prospective jurors at any time for reasons not explicitly articulated in Article 35.16, whether it be on motion of the parties, request of the juror himself, or sua sponte. Some examples of circumstances where such an action is necessary include jurors who seem to be too preoccupied with their own personal lives to perform their duties as a juror conscientiously, jurors whose intelligence or vocabulary is so limited that they cannot understand the routine words and concepts used in the trial, and jurors who are too nervous and distraught at the proposition of jury service to do a good job. Trial courts must have the authority to exercise their judgment when considering these as well as any other facts which would render a prospective juror incapable or unfit to serve. With these comments, I join the opinion of the Court.

Price, J.

Delivered: June 30, 1999

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