Keasler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Meyers, Mansfield, Price, Holland, Womack, and Johnson, J.J., joined. McCormick, P.J., delivered a dissenting opinion in which Keller, J., joined. Keller, J., delivered a dissenting opinion.

When Detective N. P. Welsh arrested juvenile John Baptist Vie Le, he first took Le to a magistrate, who gave Le the required juvenile warnings. He then took Le directly to the homicide division of the police department, where he interviewed Le and obtained a statement from him. We must decide whether Detective Welsh’s actions violated the Family Code. We conclude that they did.

Babykutty John was shot to death when he answered a knock at his front door. The police investigation led to Le, a juvenile, as a suspect. Detective Welsh arrested Le and took him to the offices of a Houston city magistrate. The magistrate gave Le the required juvenile warnings with no one else present in the room. Le was then taken to the Houston Police Department homicide division, where Detective Welsh and another police officer interviewed him. He gave a statement admitting his part in the murder and attempted robbery of the victim, but he did not sign the statement at that time. Finally, Le was taken to another magistrate and given the warnings again. At that time he signed his statement, without any police officers being present.

Le was certified to stand trial as an adult and indicted by the grand jury for capital murder. He moved to suppress his written statement, but the trial court denied the motion. The statement was admitted at Le’s trial. The jury found him guilty, and the court sentenced him, as required, to life in prison.¹

Le presented three arguments for suppression to the trial court. First, he argued the statement was improperly obtained at the homicide division rather than a juvenile processing office. Second, he argued the procedures followed by the police violated this Court’s opinion in Comer, infra. Finally, he relied on his written motion to suppress evidence, in which he contended the State failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of § 52.02(a)(2) and (3) of the Family Code.

On appeal, Le argued that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress because Detective Welsh failed to bring him to an office or official designated by the juvenile court, or to a detention facility, as required by § 52.02(a)(2) and (3). The Court of Appeals rejected Le’s claim. It noted that Le was taken to a designated juvenile processing office under § 52.025. The Court concluded that this satisfied § 52.02(a).²

Le claims that § 52.02(a) was violated when Detective Welsh took him to the homicide division and obtained a statement from him. Because Detective Welsh had probable cause to arrest him, Le argues, he was required to take Le “without unnecessary delay” to either an office or official designated by the juvenile court³ or to a detention facility.⁴ Le concedes he was first taken to a juvenile processing office under § 52.025. But he complains that he was not then taken “without unnecessary delay” to either an office or official designated by the juvenile court or a detention facility — the only available options under § 52.02(a). Le also claims that any statement should have been obtained at the juvenile processing office, rather than the homicide division.

The State responds that Le was taken to a juvenile processing office first, so there was no violation of the Family Code. The State also argues that Le was not in custody at the time his statement was taken, so these statutes do not apply. But the State essentially conceded custody in the trial court. The prosecutor stated at the suppression hearing that “[t]here are strong indications that he was in custody but it is a determination to be made by the Court . . ., but even if he was in custody they followed all of the requirements of the [Family Code].” The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that Le was in custody. We will do the same.

Section 52.02(a) of the Family Code provides that a person who takes a child into custody shall, “without unnecessary delay and without first taking the child to any place other than a juvenile processing office designated under Section 52.025 of this code,” do one of the following:

(1) release the child to a parent . . . ;
(2) bring the child before the office or official designated by the juvenile court if there is probable cause to believe that the child engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision;
(3) bring the child to a detention facility designated by the juvenile court;
(4) bring the child to a medical facility . . .; or
(5) dispose of the case . . .

Section 52.025 then provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) The juvenile court may designate an office or a room, which may be located in a police facility or sheriff’s offices, as the juvenile processing office for the temporary detention of a child taken into custody . . .
(b) A child may be detained in a juvenile processing office only for:
(1) the return of the child to the custody of a [parent] . . .;
(2) the completion of essential forms and records required by the juvenile court or this title;
(3) the photographing and fingerprinting of the child . . .;
(4) the issuance of warnings to the child as required or permitted by this title; or
(5) the receipt of a statement by the child under Section 51.09(b) of this code.

The starting point in analyzing the meaning of a statute is the statutory language.⁵ When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of its words.⁶ On the other hand, when the words are ambiguous, or the plain meaning of the words would lead to an absurd result which the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we look to extratextual factors to ascertain the statute's meaning.⁷

Section 52.02(a) commands the officer taking the child into custody to “do one of the following” “without unnecessary delay” and “without first taking the child to any place.” The statute provides only one exception. The officer may first take the child to “a juvenile processing office designated under Section 52.025.” That is an option, but it is not a requirement. If the officer elects to take the child to a juvenile processing office, § 52.025 limits what may occur there. Only five things may occur, one of which is obtaining a statement from the child.

Reading the two statutes in concert, the plain language reveals that a statement may be obtained at a juvenile processing office, but there is no requirement that this occur. Indeed, there is no requirement that the child be taken to a juvenile processing office at all. Rather, a juvenile processing office is the only place an officer can take the child other than the five options presented in § 52.02(a). It is, in essence, a sixth option. The taking of a juvenile to a juvenile processing office, however, does not dispense with the requirement that, subsequently, the officer, “without unnecessary delay,” do one of the five possibilities listed in § 52.02(a).

Although the statute’s plain language is clear in that respect, we do find some ambiguity in the phrase “designated juvenile processing office.” Is this an office wholly separate from any of the five options listed in § 52.02(a), or could one office conceivably satisfy both § 52.025 and § 52.02(a)? For example, could one office simultaneously qualify as a juvenile processing office under § 52.025 and as an office or official designated by the juvenile court under § 52.02(a)(2)?

The text of the two statutes does not completely resolve this question. But there is some indication that the two offices must be separate. Section 52.025(d) specifically limits the amount of time that a juvenile can spend in a processing office to six hours. There is no such time limit on any of the options listed in § 52.02(a) . . . and for good reason. The options in § 52.02(a) are essentially permanent options. Once taken to any of those places, the police officer’s involvement in the case ceases. This is not so in § 52.025. The statutes contemplate that an officer may first, for a maximum of six hours, take a juvenile to a processing center for paperwork, but he then must take the child to one of the options in § 52.02(a). This implies that one office cannot satisfy both statutes.

But this alone is not enough to render the statute unambiguous. We therefore look to extratextual factors, as Boykin instructs us to do. Our review of the legislative history of § 52.025 provides some guidance. Senator Dickson sponsored Senate Bill 1230, which enacted § 52.025. He explained the bill to the Senate as follows:

If a citizen who is a juvenile is arrested and charged with a crime, the statute, the Family Code, provides that he must be taken to a number of designated places, or, it provides that the officers have the right to take him to a number of designated places. Those include places such as his parents’ home or to his custodian, to a juvenile detention center. That is not practical in many cases and the ordinary course of business is for juvenile officers who have arrested, or officers who have arrested juveniles, to take them for processing for a short period of time to another facility. This, there is some question as to whether that may be done in view of the designation of the various places where a juvenile can be taken. It is done as a matter of the ordinary course of a, of business. It seems appropriate that, in order to do the necessary paperwork, for a short period of time a juvenile might be taken to a processing center. That is what this bill does.⁸

Based on this explanation, it appears that the Legislature envisioned the “juvenile processing office” in § 52.025 was envisioned as little more than a temporary stop for completing necessary paperwork pursuant to the arrest. As Senator Dickson later explained, it is necessary simply in order for the juvenile’s “name, rank, and serial number be taken.”⁹ The statute’s express language reflects this intent, in that it authorizes detention at the processing office for the completion of paperwork.¹⁰ Senator’s Dickson’s description of this place as “another facility” indicates that § 52.025 was intended to create a separate place for completing this paperwork, and that after doing so, the officers would then comply with § 52.02(a).

Given Senator Dickson’s explanation of Senate Bill 1230, we find that a single office cannot simultaneously qualify as both a juvenile processing office under § 52.025 and an office or official designated by the juvenile court under § 52.02(a)(2).

Turning now to the facts of this case, Detective Welsh first took Le to a city magistrate, which, according to testimony presented at the hearing, had been designated by the juvenile court as a “juvenile processing office.” This was permissible under § 52.025. He then took Le to the homicide division of the Houston police department to obtain a statement. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the homicide division was either an “office or official designated by the juvenile court” under § 52.02(a)(2) or a “detention facility designated by the juvenile court” under § 52.02(a)(3). Obviously, taking Le to the homicide division did not satisfy the other options in § 52.02(a), as it did not constitute releasing him to his parent, bringing him to a medical facility, or disposing of the case. Upon leaving the juvenile processing office, Detective Welsh was required to do one of the five options listed in § 52.02(a) “without unnecessary delay.” Taking Le to the homicide division did not constitute any of these five options. Detective Welsh violated the Family Code by his actions.

Le also argues that any statement obtained should have been obtained at the juvenile processing office. We disagree. As explained, obtaining a statement at a juvenile processing office is permissible but is not required. Detective Welsh’s error was not in obtaining the statement at the homicide division; it was in doing so prematurely. He should have first, “without unnecessary delay,” taken Le to a juvenile officer or detention facility. A juvenile officer could have, at that point, referred the case back to Detective Welsh for the purpose of obtaining a statement.

We recognized in Comer v. State¹¹ that the language of § 52.02 dictated what an officer must do “without unnecessary delay” when he takes a child into custody. We concluded that

the clear intent of the statutory scheme as a whole . . . from this point on [is that] the decision as to whether further detention is called for is to be made, not by law enforcement personnel, but by the intake or other authorized officer of the court . . . [I]t appears that . . . the Legislature intended to restrict involvement of law enforcement officers to the initial seizure and prompt release or commitment of the juvenile offender . . .¹²

At the time we wrote Comer, § 52.02 provided the steps an officer must take “without unnecessary delay and without first taking the child anywhere else.” In 1991, the Legislature changed that language to read: “without unnecessary delay and without first taking the child to any place other than a juvenile processing office designated under Section 52.025.” The Legislature also added § 52.025, which defines a juvenile processing office and states what may occur there.

But these amendments had no effect on the clear intent of the statutory scheme. Today we reaffirm our decision in Comer. The Legislature has set forth very specific actions which a law enforcement officer must take when arresting a juvenile. We are aware of the disturbing increase in juvenile crime in our state, and we are sympathetic to law enforcement’s efforts to deal with violent juvenile offenders. Nevertheless, we must not ignore the Legislature’s mandatory provisions regarding the arrest of juveniles. We informed the citizenry, a decade ago in a unanimous opinion, of the Legislature’s clear intent to reduce an officer’s impact on a juvenile in custody. Today we remind police officers of the Family Code’s strict requirements.

The State relies on Beaver v. State¹³ to argue that the Family Code was followed. However, the issue in Beaver was whether the police officer had the authority to investigate the case and interview the juvenile, because the juvenile detention officer had not formally referred the case to law enforcement under § 52.04(b). The Court of Appeals held that no formal ceremony is required to constitute a referral, and under the facts of that case, a referral had occurred. Beaver does not alter our holding in Comer and is not relevant to this case.

The State also seems to argue that the initial taking of Le to the juvenile processing office dispensed with any need to then comply with § 52.02(a). We disagree. Section 52.025 does not “trump” § 52.02(a). The two statutes must be read together. While § 52.025 presents another option for law enforcement personnel, this option’s use does not dispense with the other Family Code requirements. Upon leaving the juvenile processing office with Le, Detective Welsh was required to follow § 52.02(a), and he did not.

Illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible against the accused in a criminal case.¹⁴ We have concluded that Le’s statement was obtained in violation of the Family Code but was nevertheless admitted at his trial. The issue remains whether this error was harmful.¹⁵ The Court of Appeals found no error in the admissibility of the statement, so it did not consider whether the admission of the statement harmed Le. Therefore, we must remand this case for consideration of this issue.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this cause is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DATE DELIVERED: May 19, 1999

PUBLISH

¹ Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.31(a) (Vernon 1994); § 8.07(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999).

² Le v. State, No. 14-94-01265-CR (Tex. App. — Houston [14^th Dist.] October 23, 1997).

³ Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 52.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1996).

⁴ Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 52.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1996).

⁵ Brown v. State, 943 S.W.2d 35, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

⁶ Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ 72^nd Legislative Session, May 9, 1991, Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 (emphasis added).

⁹ 72^nd Legislative Session, May 26, 1991, Tape 1 of 6, Side 1.

¹⁰ Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 52.025(b)(2) (Vernon 1996).

¹¹ 776 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

¹² Id. at 194-95.

¹³ 824 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [14^th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d).

¹⁴ Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art. 38.23(a).

¹⁵ Tex. R. App. P. 44.2.