McCormick, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Mansfield, Keller, Holland and Keasler, JJ, joined; Price, J., filed a dissenting opinion joined by Meyers and Johnson, JJ.; Womack, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Johnson, J., joined.

Appellee was indicted for tampering with a governmental record by making false entries in an application for government benefits. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order suppressing appellee’s statement taken by Oscar Rodriguez, an investigator for the Texas Department of Human Services, because the statement was involuntarily made. The State appealed the order. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cause for trial, holding there was no reasonable view of the record that supported the trial court’s granting of the motion to suppress. State v. Terrazas, 970 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998). We granted appellee’s ground for review in which she argues that the Court of Appeals failed to afford proper deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations.

Rodriguez testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. According to Rodriguez, appellee’s ex-husband informed the Department of Human Services that their children were living with him for nine months in 1993. Rodriguez investigated the complaint and contacted appellee in January 1995. Rodriguez told her that he was reviewing her Aid to Families with Dependent Children case and food stamp case and that she needed to come to his office to clear up some problems. At the office, Rodriguez advised her that there were allegations about the custody of her children and where her children had been residing. He testified that he advised her of her rights. Rodriguez informed appellee that he had information that her children were not living with her and she was receiving government benefits, which was a violation of policy. Rodriguez testified as follows:

“DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Now, as far as on the voluntary statement here, what is claimed to be her voluntary statement —

“RODRIGUEZ: Yes, sir.

“Q: — as far as — is there anything more that you would like to say in your statement, the written-in information, as well as did you fail to report any changes between applications and interviews, if so what changes. Now, as far as the contents of those, did you tell her what to put in there?

“A: No, I don’t tell her what to put in there. I answer the questions, but I don’t tell them what to put on there.

“Q: What do you mean you answer the questions?

“A: Well, if they ask me a question, you know, what do I do here, or on dates or whatever, but I don’t exactly tell them what to put on there.

“Q: Well, how on earth would they know what to put in there, then?

“A: Well, I tell them, this is what the allegations are, and this is what has to go on the voluntarily [sic] statement. Verbatim, I do not.

“Q: Okay. But you basically say, this is what has to be put in there, right?

“A: That’s correct.

“Q: So you pretty much kind of explain to her what she is supposed to put in there, right?

“A: That’s correct.”

Rodriguez testified that benefit recipients must report changes in circumstances within ten days, such as the fact that children are not residing in the home. He said that appellee was being prosecuted for failing to report the fact that her children were not residing with her.

On cross-examination by the prosecuting attorney, Rodriguez testified that he did not promise appellee anything in return for the statement, he did not threaten her, and she had the opportunity to read the statement and make changes. Appellee’s statement included the following:

“I did not report that my kid where living with there father for the month of June thr. Sept. 93. In Nov. 93 Martin return to live with his father. In Aug. 94 Martin came to live with me until Nov. 94. . . . I did not report thise information within 10 days. I should have reported this information. I used my food stamp card for Dec. 94.” [sic throughout]

Rodriguez testified that appellee provided that information, wrote the statement, and signed it. The trial court asked Rodriguez about what happened:

“THE COURT: What part of that stuff is the stuff that you told her had to be in there?

“RODRIGUEZ: I’m sorry, Your Honor?

“THE COURT: I thought your previous testimony was that some of the stuff that was in there was stuff that you told her had to be in there. What of that information did you tell her had to be in there?

“A: Well, the allegations that —

“THE COURT: Well, just read the part of the statement that you told her had to be in there.
“A: I did not report this information within ten days.

“THE COURT: Okay.

The prosecuting attorney continued the cross-examination:

“PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Sir, did you ask her questions about where her children were residing during these dates between March 17^th of 1993 and the taking of this statement on January 25^th of 1995?

“RODRIGUEZ: Yes, I did.

“Q: And this was after you warned her of her rights?

“A: That’s correct.

“Q: Okay. All those rights that are on the warning form, the advisement of waiver of rights form which is form 4801?

“A: That’s correct.

“Q: Did she advise you that her children were, in fact, with the father of the children through those months that are stated here, of June through September, 1993, and November of 1993?

“A: Yes, she did.

“Q: Okay. And then in stating on there those things that the judge has just asked you, you said that had to be on the statement, correct?

“A: Yes.

“Q: That was in response to a question, did you fail to report any changes —

“A: She failed to report within the ten days.

“Q: Okay. And then it was — that was what you were referring to that had to be on here?

“A: Yes.

“Q: Okay. Did she advise you that that was, in fact, correct?

“A: Yes, she did.”

At the end of the hearing, the judge stated he was suppressing appellee’s written statement because it was involuntary.

After setting out the law regarding voluntariness of statements, the Court of Appeals stated:

“[Appellee] suggests that Rodriguez told [her] what to put in her statement and this constituted official overreaching or coerciveness. At the hearing, the trial court showed some interest in this contention. However, the evidence indicates that [appellee] agreed at the time that these contentions were true. If a confession relates what is told to a peace officer, the confession is still voluntary albeit it is not in the exact words of the defendant.

In the present case, we are unable to find any reasonable view of the record that supports the court’s granting of the motion to suppress. As Rodriguez was the only witness to relate the events surrounding the taking of the statement, we are unable to find any element of coercion that overrode [appellee’s] exercise of free will. Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion to grant [appellee’s] motion to suppress the statement.” Terrazas, 970 S.W.2d at 162.

Substantive constitutional law prohibits the government from using an involuntary confession against an accused with the test for voluntariness being whether the confession is the product “of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schnecklock v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995) (statement is involuntary “only if there was official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker”). Whether the confession is true or false is irrelevant to a voluntariness determination because it is the methods used to extract an involuntary confession that offend constitutional principles. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 624 fn 12, 625 fn 13, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972).

Our current statutory law set out in Article 38.22, Section 6, V.A.C.C.P., for litigating pretrial the voluntariness of a confession can be traced back to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-88, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Jackson invalidated on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds the “New York rule” for litigating the voluntariness of a confession. See Jackson, 84 S.Ct. at 1777-91; State v. Ibarra, 953 S.W.2d 242, 252-53 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting).

Texas apparently followed the “New York rule” which authorized a trial court to suppress a confession on voluntariness grounds only if the undisputed facts showed its involuntariness; otherwise, usually when disputed fact issues on the voluntariness question existed, a trial court had no discretion but to submit the voluntariness question to the jury. Jackson, 84 S.Ct. at 1780-88; Lego, 92 S.Ct. at 622-23; Ibarra, 953 S.W.2d at 252 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (“New York rule” provided that if there existed a factual dispute on the voluntariness of a confession, trial court had no discretion but to submit the issue to the jury); see also Prince v. State, 231 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex.Cr.App. 1950) (trial court could suppress confession only if “undisputed facts in criminal case show that confession was not and could not have been voluntarily made”). The rationale of Jackson was that juries could not be trusted to decide voluntariness questions fairly and accurately. See Jackson, 84 S.Ct. at 1777-91; Ibarra, 953 S.W.2d at 252 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting).

Soon after the Supreme Court decided Jackson, this Court decided Lopez v. State in which the Supreme Court had granted certiorari and then remanded to this Court in light of Jackson. Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.Cr.App. 1964). In Lopez this Court set out court-made procedures consistent with Jackson for litigating the voluntariness of a confession. Lopez, 384 S.W.2d at 348-49. These procedures empowered a trial court to suppress a confession without submitting the issue to the jury when “the evidence present[ed] a fair question as to its voluntariness, as where certain facts bearing on the issue are in dispute or where reasonable men could differ over the inference to be drawn from undisputed facts.” Lopez, 384 S.W.2d at 349 (Woodley, P.J., concurring); Note: Procedure-Defendant Entitled To Hearing On Voluntariness Of Confession Before It Goes To the Jury, 43 Tex.L.Rev. 396, 396-99 (1965).

In response to Jackson and Lopez our Legislature enacted what is now Article 38.22, Section 6,¹ which sets out the procedures for litigating voluntariness claims in “all cases[²] where a question is raised as to the voluntariness of a statement of an accused.” See Ibarra, 953 S.W.2d at 252-53 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting). The typical scenario for litigating voluntariness questions usually involves a defendant presenting evidence³ that the police used unconstitutional methods to obtain a confession with the prosecution controverting this evidence with evidence that the police used constitutional methods to obtain the confession. See, e.g., Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210-211 (defendant testified pretrial that police coerced his confession which the police denied); Lego, 92 S.Ct. at 628 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (typical case normally presents factfinder “with conflicting testimony from the defendant and law enforcement officers about what occurred during the officers’ interrogation of the defendant”).

When a defendant presents evidence raising a voluntariness question, the prosecution must controvert that evidence and prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. See Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 211; Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 116 (1993) (prosecution need not rebut defendant’s “assertions” but only controvert them). However, the prosecution is not put to this burden unless a defendant presents evidence that raises a voluntariness question. See Article 38.22, Section 6, (not applicable unless “a question is raised as to the voluntariness of a statement”); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 544 fn 7 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990) (“voluntariness must be put in issue by facts before it is an issue”); Dunn v. State, 721 S.W.2d 325, 336 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986); compare Article 38.22, Section 7, V.A.C.C.P., (trial court not required to submit voluntariness question to jury unless “issue is raised by the evidence”).

Since appellee won in the trial court and the trial court made no express or written fact findings, then the Court of Appeals was required to imply all necessary fact findings that would support the trial court’s ruling. And the Court of Appeals was required to defer to these implied fact findings that the record supports especially when these findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997). In other words, since appellee won in the trial court, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling that appellee’s statement is involuntary.

Appellee apparently argues the Court of Appeals misapplied this standard of review by engaging in an improper review of the facts.⁴ Appellee claims portions of Rodriguez’ testimony support a finding that Rodriguez told appellee “what had to be” or “what to put” in her statement. Appellee also claims the Court of Appeals was required to disregard any other portions of Rodriguez’ testimony that contradicted this implied finding.

And, we agree. Although we do not read the Court of Appeals’ opinion as disregarding this implied finding, the Court of Appeals apparently relied on other portions of Rodriguez’ testimony to the effect that appellee “agreed at the time that these contentions were true.” Terrazas, 970 S.W.2d at 162. However, as a matter of substantive constitutional law, the Court of Appeals erred to rely on this testimony in deciding the voluntariness question because this testimony is irrelevant to a voluntariness determination. See Lego, 92 S.Ct. At 624 fn 11 (truth or falsity of statement irrelevant to voluntariness determination).

Based on the foregoing, the essential implied fact finding to which we must defer is that Rodriguez told appellee “what had to be” in her statement. However, since the ultimate resolution of the voluntariness question does not turn on this implied fact finding, we may review de novo the trial court’s and the Court of Appeals’ legal ruling on the voluntariness question. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89 (intermediate appellate courts and this Court may review de novo “mixed questions of law and fact” the ultimate resolution of which does not turn on an evaluation of credibility or demeanor).⁵

Relying on this Court’s decision in Cruz v. State, appellee argues the implied fact finding that Rodriguez told her “what had to be” in her statement provides a sufficient basis to support the trial court’s legal ruling that appellee did not provide a voluntary statement because this statement was really Rodriguez’ statement and not hers. See Cruz v. State, 586 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979). We disagree.

In Cruz this Court noted the facts and circumstances were “unique” which the Court “trusted” would “never again be presented.” Cruz, 586 S.W.2d at 862-65. In Cruz the defendant’s lawyer concocted a scheme to render a voluntary statement inadmissible. Id. When this lawyer learned the defendant was a suspect in a murder case, this lawyer prepared a statement inculpating the defendant. Id. The lawyer then had the defendant sign the statement without reading it. Id. When the lawyer and the defendant went to the police station, a detective wanted to take the defendant’s statement. Id. The lawyer indicated that would be unnecessary and gave the detective the statement. Id. When the detective began reading the defendant his rights, the lawyer interrupted and said the defendant already knew his rights. Id. The defendant then signed the statement again without reading it. Id.

The defendant later moved to suppress the statement. Id. The defendant’s lawyer testified his “three-fold purpose” was to render the statement inadmissible by having the defendant sign it without reading it, by deliberately failing to read the defendant his rights, and by making the statement “his own version” of what the defendant told him. Id. The trial court ruled the statement admissible. Id. However, on direct appeal this Court decided as a matter of state law that a proper predicate had not been laid for the admission of the statement primarily because the statement was not “made by the accused.” Id.

This case clearly is not like Cruz. Even though Rodriguez told appellee “what had to be” in her statement, the statement nevertheless was made by appellee. There is no evidence to support a finding that Rodriguez prepared a statement which he had appellee sign without reading it. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89 (appellate courts should defer to fact findings that the record supports).

More important Cruz did not decide the defendant’s statement in that case was involuntary⁶ which is the claim appellee makes in this case. We decline to extend Cruz beyond the unique facts and circumstances of that case.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we decide the Court of Appeals correctly decided the trial court’s legal ruling on the voluntariness question was erroneous. Rodriguez telling appellee in a noncustodial setting “what had to be” in her statement is not the type of practice that has been held to be inherently coercive as to make a statement involuntary. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2360-65, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) (no one could contend the interrogation faced by the defendant bore any resemblance to the historical practices at which the right against compulsory self- incrimination was aimed, “a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality”); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1770, L.Ed.2d (1966) (defendant’s will overborne by “sustained pressures upon him” such as repeated interrogations over sixteen days without being advised of rights and without being allowed to see anyone or make telephone calls); Note: Evidence-Criminal Law-Constitutional Law-Due Process-Confessions- Judge and Jury-Determination of Preliminary Fact of Voluntariness of Confession, 3 Baylor L.Rev. 561, 563-65 (1951) (inherently coercive practices are: subjection to persistent and protracted questioning, threats of mob violence, unlawful detention incommunicado without advice of counsel or friends, and taking at night to lonely and isolated places for questioning).

Finally, appellee also appears to argue the trial court’s ruling suppressing her statement should be upheld because the trial court was not required to believe any of Rodriguez’ testimony. Appellee seems to claim the prosecution with the burden to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence carried the risk of nonpersuasion on the voluntariness question in the event the trial court did not believe any of Rodriguez’ testimony.

We agree that the trial court did not have to believe any of Rodriguez’ testimony. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. However, this does not require suppression of appellee’s statement. The prosecution is not put to its burden to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence until a defendant presents some evidence raising a question of voluntariness. See Article 38.22, Section 6; Romero, 800 S.W.2d at 544 fn 7; Dunn, 721 S.W.2d at 336.

We have already essentially decided that Rodriguez’ testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, did not raise a voluntariness question, and appellee presented no other evidence that raised a voluntariness question. Under these circumstances, the prosecution never assumed the burden to prove voluntariness or to controvert evidence of involuntariness, so it never assumed the risk of nonpersuasion on the voluntariness question in the event the trial court did not believe any of Rodriguez’ testimony. See Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 252 (prosecution need not rebut defendant’s “assertions” of involuntariness, but only controvert them).

We also note that in these circumstances appellee would not be entitled to a jury instruction on voluntariness. See Article 38.22, Section 7; Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 236 (Tex.Cr.App. 1994), cert.denied, 115 S.Ct. 1115 (1995) (before requested jury instruction on voluntariness is required, some evidence must be presented to jury which raises the issue of voluntariness). For essentially the same reasons appellee was not entitled to a favorable ruling from the trial court on the voluntariness question in the event the trial court did not believe any of Rodriguez’ testimony.

Finally, questions have been raised on whether Article 38.22, Section 6, even applies to this case and whether this Court should sua sponte remand this case to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law. For example, our decision in Nenno suggests Article 38.22 applies only to custodial statements. See Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 556, Footnote 2 of this Opinion. However, Article 38.22, Section 6, literally applies to “all cases where a question is raised as to the voluntariness of a statement of an accused.” Nenno is overruled to the extent it decides Article 38.22, Section 6, applies only to custodial statements.

In addition, Article 38.22, Section 6, requires the trial court to “enter an order” containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law only if it decides the statement was voluntarily made. Since the trial court in this case decided appellee’s statement was involuntary, then it was not required to “enter an order” containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Assuming Article 38.22, Section 6, required the trial court to enter such an order, we are not inclined to exercise our discretion to remand this case sua sponte to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither party has complained about the absence of findings and conclusions. And, nothing in Jackson v. Denno requires them. The “right” to findings and conclusions is a statutory “right” which is forfeited by a party’s failure to insist upon its implementation. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278-79 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993).

Judge Price’s dissenting opinion claims the “voluntariness” determination turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Terrazas, S.W.2d at Slip op. at 2. This dissenting opinion claims the “controversy at issue here is not that the statement was made, but rather what was meant by the statement. More aptly put, what did Rodriguez mean when he made the statement, and given the circumstances of the questioning, what did [appellee] think Rodriguez meant when she heard the statement.” Id.

Assuming these considerations are relevant to a “voluntariness” determination, the meaning of Rodriguez’ statement to appellee telling her “what had to be” in her statement seems plain on its face not susceptible to differing interpretations, and the dissenting opinion suggests no interpretation of or inference from Rodriguez’ statement that would support a finding of “involuntariness” or improper overreaching by Rodriguez that overbore appellee’s will. And, since appellee did not avail herself of her opportunity to testify at the suppression hearing, we will not speculate on what she thought Rodriguez meant “when she heard the statement.” See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89 (requiring appellate courts to defer to trial court’s implied findings that the record supports).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling as required by Guzman, we have decided Rodriguez telling appellee “what had to be” in her statement did not constitute wringing the statement out of appellee against her will. This essentially is the issue upon which this case turns.

It is possible reasonable minds might differ on this issue but the state action in this case does not rise anywhere near to the level of the police misconduct and overreaching in the “involuntary confession” cases cited in this opinion and the authorities upon which these cases relied. And the dissent does not cite a single controlling case holding on facts similar to these that the defendant’s statement was involuntary. This further causes the Court to believe it has reached a fair result in this case and one in accordance with the law.

The dissenting opinion appears to concede the lack of state action that would support a finding of overreaching or misconduct by Rodriguez that overbore appellee’s will. Terrazas, S.W.2d at Slip op. at 3. Rather the dissenting opinion seems to focus almost entirely on the “characteristics of the accused” such as “the age of the accused, the accused’s lack of education or low intelligence[⁷] and the lack of any advice to the accused of [her] constitutional rights.” Id. The dissenting opinion apparently claims these characteristics together with “the details of the interrogation” support a finding of involuntariness. Id.

However, factors bearing on the characteristics of the accused are irrelevant in the absence of any state action that would support a finding of police misconduct or overreaching. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520-21, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (“involuntary confession” cases focus on “crucial element of police overreaching”).⁸ As the dissenting opinion fails to identify any “crucial element of police overreaching” in this case, it is unnecessary to consider any “characteristics of the accused” which the record would support.

In summary, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling as required by Guzman, we decide Rodriguez telling appellee “what had to be” in her statement does not support a finding or legal conclusion of “involuntariness” or state action that overbore appellee’s will. This case is not much different from an officer taking a defendant’s oral statement, reducing it to writing and then having the defendant sign the statement.

We also decide the prosecution never assumed the burden to prove voluntariness because appellee failed to present any evidence raising a question of voluntariness or supporting a finding of involuntariness that the prosecution was required to controvert. The argument that we should uphold the trial court’s ruling because the trial court did not have to believe any of Rodriguez’ testimony would permit suppression of statements and confessions when there is no evidence to support a finding of involuntariness. This is not the rule either as a matter of state law or federal constitutional law. Our decision in this case does not, as the dissenting opinion claims, require the trial court “as a matter of law to [have believed] all of Rodriguez’ testimony.” Terrazas, S.W.2d at Slip op. at 5.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

McCormick, Presiding Judge

(Delivered September 15, 1999)
En Banc
¹
Acts 1965, 59^th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722 (permitting submission of “voluntariness” issue to jury only after “confession or statement” had “been found to have been voluntarily made and held admissible as a matter of law and fact by the court in a hearing in the absence of the jury”).
²
Article 38.22 as enacted in 1965 only applied if the defendant “was in jail or other place of confinement or in the custody of an officer.” Acts 1965, 59^th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722. In 1967 what is now Article 38.22, Section 6, was rewritten to apply to “all cases where a question is raised as to the voluntariness of a confession or statement.” Acts 1967, 60^th Leg., p. 1740, ch. 659, Section 23; but see Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998) (“Article 38.22 applies only to persons in custody”).
³
If a defendant testifies pretrial, “the scope of cross- examination [is] limited to the issue of voluntariness, and the fact that the defendant testifies [pretrial does] not compel him to take the stand at the trial on the merits.” 43 Tex.L.Rev. at 398 and authorities cited therein.
⁴
Appellee argues this case as if we were an intermediate appellate court reviewing the trial court’s ruling rather than a discretionary court reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
⁵
An example where the resolution of the ultimate question of voluntariness would turn on an implied fact finding involving an evaluation of credibility and demeanor would be where a trial court grants a motion to suppress on conflicting testimony that the police tortured a confession out of a suspect. In this example the trial court’s implied fact finding that the confession was obtained by torture would be dispositive of the voluntariness issue. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.
⁶
On the contrary, the evidence in Cruz supports a finding of voluntariness in the sense that the defendant was not coerced or forced to sign the statement.
⁷
Of course, since appellee did not testify at the suppression hearing, the record contains no evidence bearing on any of these issues.
⁸
The facts of this case also do not rise anywhere near to the level of the “involuntary confession” cases cited in Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 520 fn 1.