Meyers J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which McCormick, P.J., and Mansfield, Keller, Womack, Johnson, and Keasler, J. J, joined. Holland, J., delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Price, J., joined.

Appellant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The following day, a misdemeanor information charging her with the offense of driving while intoxicated was filed. On June 7, 1995, an administrative law judge concluded that the Department of Public Safety had failed to prove the arresting officer had probable cause to stop Appellant. As such, Appellant’s drivers license was not suspended. Appellant then filed a motion to suppress the evidence in the driving while intoxicated prosecution, asserting the State was collaterally estopped from litigating the issues of reasonable suspicion and probable cause due to the conclusions of the administrative law judge. The trial judge denied that motion. Appellant then filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging the trial judge should have granted her motion because the administrative finding of no probable cause estopped the State from proving that reasonable suspicion existed to arrest her. The trial judge denied Appellant’s writ.

Appellant appealed to the Second Court of Appeals and the State moved to dismiss. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on June 27, 1996.¹ Appellant filed a motion for rehearing, and on September 20, 1996 the court granted that motion and withdrew its prior opinion. On July 10, 1997, the court issued a new opinion² affirming the trial judge’s denial of appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Headrick, 948 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1997, pet. granted). We granted Appellant’s petition for discretionary review, as well as the State’s petition for discretionary review. We conclude the State’s second ground for review, which asks whether an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle by which to raise a claim of collateral estoppel, should be answered in the negative.³

In its second ground for review, the State asserts the court of appeals erred in addressing the merits of Appellant’s claim. Essentially, the State argues that under circumstances present in this case--the absence of a double jeopardy problem--courts should not address collateral estoppel in a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. We agree.

The writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary writ; neither a trial court nor an appellate court should entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus where there is an adequate remedy at law. Ex parte Hopkins, 610 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Ex parte Powell, 558 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. Crim. App.1978). An applicant must be restrained illegally to be entitled to relief. Ex parte Strother, 395 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. Crim. App.1965); Ex parte Rios, 385 S.W.2d 677, 678 (1965). Habeas corpus is not appropriate where resolution of the question presented, even if resolved in favor of the applicant, would not result in immediate release. Ex parte Ruby, 403 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. Crim. App.1966).

Collateral estoppel is closely related to the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. As the United States Supreme Court stated, " '[c]ollateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). In Ashe, the defendant had been acquitted of armed robbery of a poker player because there was not enough evidence to establish identity. The same

defendant was prosecuted a second time for armed robbery of a different poker player at the same game. In that case there had been a final judgment determining an issue of ultimate fact, namely whether Ashe was one of the robbers at the poker game. In situations like Ashe, it is appropriate to apply for pretrial writ of habeas corpus advancing arguments concerning collateral estoppel and constitutional double jeopardy violations. Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). This is because the right not to be tried twice for the same offense would be meaningless if it could not be raised before the commencement of the second trial. Id.

The present case, however, does not present a double jeopardy question. The State and Appellant agree that even if Appellant were entitled to the relief she seeks, the State would not be prevented from pursuing the pending prosecution for driving while intoxicated. Under these circumstances, collateral estoppel is an evidentiary issue not properly raised in an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. Appellant has an adequate remedy at law, which is to raise the denial of her pretrial motion to suppress on direct appeal, if convicted. The relief Appellant requests underscores the fact this is a matter inappropriately raised on habeas. Appellant seeks

an order reversing the judgments of the lower courts, setting aside the trial judge’s order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress, and requiring the trial judge to grant Appellant’s motion.

We conclude that collateral estoppel claims not alleging constitutional double jeopardy violations are not cognizable on application for pretrial writ of habeas corpus. In such cases there is an adequate remedy at law, and the proper procedure is to raise the collateral estoppel issue on direct appeal. We sustain the State’s second ground for review and dismiss the State’s other ground for review, as well as Appellant’s grounds for review.

We vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause for disposition in accordance with this opinion.

Delivered: March 10, 1999

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¹In its original opinion, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

²In its revised opinion, the court of appeals addressed the merits of Appellant’s appeal without addressing whether a claim of collateral estoppel is properly raised on application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus.

³In her dissenting opinion, Judge Holland remarks that “It serves no purpose for this Court to decide whether a motion to suppress or a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus is the more appropriate vehicle to raise a claim, when this Court has decided there is no merit to that claim.” Holland, J., dissenting; slip op. at 2.

The dissent fails to recognize that the issue presented in this case is not mooted by our past decisions. The dissent points out that in State v. Brabson, 975 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) we held administrative law judges did not have authority to make findings on probable cause to arrest under article 67011-5, and that there was no privity between the prosecutor’s office and the Department of Public Safety. These points, however, go to the merits of the claim. The point of today’s holding is that it is inappropriate to reach the merits via the procedure Appellant employed. Pre-trial habeas corpus does not lie on a mere admissibility issue, even if the ALR hearing met the Brabson requirements.

We have held a full and fair hearing is a prerequisite for a claim of collateral estoppel. See State v. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Even after a full and fair hearing, a party invoking the collateral estoppel doctrine must meet the Brabson requirements, among others. Each requirement is a necessary precondition to invocation of the doctrine. If a party wishes to invoke collateral estoppel in an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus, that party must do more than make a claim for exclusion of evidence.