This page of Baker's Legal Pages contains casenotes from recent decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. This information is made available as a free public service for your personal, non-commercial use. While every effort has been made to provide accurate material at this site, it is provided "as is" and no representations are made that it is free of mistakes or inaccuracies. If you inform me of any mistake or inaccuracy that you find here, I will make every effort to determine what corrections are required and to make those changes.

Below are casenotes from recent opinions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, supplementing Baker's Texas Criminal Evidence Handbook. Each casenote is linked to the text of the opinion from which it was derived.

For links to other casesnote pages supplementing Baker's Texas Criminal Evidence Handbook, see the Criminal Evidence Handbook Casenotes Listing.

For links to casesnote pages for other handbooks, see the Main Casenotes Listing.

If you already know the name of a particular recent case of interest, you may go directly to that opinion from the Table of Recent Opinions.

deficient affidavit: lack of probable cause for place (Search Under Warrant, Error)

• It was error to deny motion to suppress evid seized in search of def's home where warrant did not authorize search of def's home. Police obtained a warrant to search the rural, gambling business premises of "Train's" which was explicitly described as a "silver in color passenger train car." This warrant did not authorize the search of def's home, an entirely different and distinct structure - a red caboose - which was located nearby. There were two problems with the search. First, there was no descriptive language in the warrant that would authorize the search of the home as well as a search of the separate and independent business establishment. Second, there were no facts set out in the affidavit* that would lead a reasonable officer executing this search warrant to have probable cause to believe that the gambling devices, paraphernalia, and business records described within the search warrant or affidavit would be found in def's home. Long v State (April 21, 2004, No. 1028-03)

error with warrant (Search Under Warrant, Error)

• It was error to deny motion to suppress evid seized in search of def's home where warrant did not authorize search of def's home. Police obtained a warrant to search the rural, gambling business premises of "Train's" which was explicitly described as a "silver in color passenger train car." This warrant did not authorize the search of def's home, an entirely different and distinct structure - a red caboose - which was located nearby. There were two problems with the search. First, there was no descriptive language in the warrant that would authorize the search of the home as well as a search of the separate and independent business establishment. Second, there were no facts set out in the affidavit* that would lead a reasonable officer executing this search warrant to have probable cause to believe that the gambling devices, paraphernalia, and business records described within the search warrant or affidavit would be found in def's home. Long v State (April 21, 2004, No. 1028-03)

notes (Search under Emergency Circumstances)

• The notion that officers act pursuant to their "community caretaker functions" serves as a basis for three separate doctrines created by the Supreme Court: 1) the emergency aid doctrine, established in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); 2) the automobile impoundment and inventory doctrine, first conceived in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), and later expanded upon in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); and, 3) the community caretaking doctrine, or public servant doctrine, established in Cady, and followed in Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) and Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The common thread in each of these three exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements is the officer's purpose. Laney v State (October 8, 2003, No. 1196-02)

• The emergency doctrine is not the same as the community caretaking doctrine established in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). The distinction between the emergency doctrine and the (Cady) community caretaking doctrine is a narrow, but critical one. Under the emergency doctrine, the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that he or she must act to "protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury." On the other hand, under the Cady doctrine, the officer might or might not believe there is a difficulty requiring his general assistance. While both doctrines are based on an officer's reasonable belief in the need to act pursuant to his or her "community caretaking functions," the emergency doctrine is limited to the functions of protecting or preserving life or avoiding serious injury. Additionally, the Cady doctrine deals primarily with warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles (and will be limited to those circumstances except in unusual circumstances), while the emergency doctrine deals with warrantless entries of, but is not limited to, private residences. Laney v State (October 8, 2003, No. 1196-02)

• As part of police officer's community caretaking functions to protect and preserve life and prevent substantial injury, an officer may enter and search a private residence without a warrant for the limited purpose of serving those functions when it is objectively reasonable. Laney v State (October 8, 2003, No. 1196-02)

• Although the emergency doctrine is considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine, there is a narrow, but critical, distinction between the two. The exigent circumstances doctrine applies when the police are acting in their "crime-fighting" role, while the emergency doctrine applies when the police are acting, not in their "crime-fighting" role, but in their limited community caretaking role to "protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury." Laney v State (October 8, 2003, No. 1196-02)

no error (Search under Emergency Circumstances)

• It was not error to deny motion to suppress evid found after officer entered def's trailer. Officer's actions in entering home to ensure well-being of young child were reasonable under the circumstances. His actions were totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Def had already been detained for suspicion of committing criminal mischief; officer did not enter def's trailer to continue his investigation of that offense. Instead, he saw two young boys, not belonging to def, emerge from def's darkened trailer sometime after midnight, and then witnessed one of the boys run back into the trailer. Officer testified that because def was going to jail, it was his responsibility to get the boy out of the trailer and find out who his parents were. Arguably, the deputies would have been criminally liable for leaving the child behind. More important to the emergency doctrine's application, there was an immediate, objectively reasonable belief on officer's part that he needed to act to protect the life of the child and prevent him from incurring serious injury. Although there was no immediate threat to the child's safety or well-being, had the boy been left alone in the trailer while deputies took appellant away, there would have been a substantial risk of harm to the child. Furthermore, officer's search was "strictly circumscribed" by the exigencies which justified its initiation. After the boy ran back in the trailer, officer called out for him but there was no response. Officer then proceeded directly to where he was told the boy was - the back bedroom. When he found the boy there, he also saw the pornographic photos in plain view. Rather than expand his search for pornographic material, he immediately took the child out of the room. Based on these circumstances, court found that the emergency doctrine applied; officer was not required to secure a warrant to enter and search def's residence. Laney v State (October 8, 2003, No. 1196-02)

protective search (Protective Search)

• When conducting an in-home arrest, a police officer may sweep the house only if he possesses an objectively reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that a person in that area poses a danger to that police officer or to other people in the area. This sweep must stay within the appropriate scope and may last long enough to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger. Reasor v State, 12 S.W.3d 813 (Mar. 1, 2000)

lawful protective search of person (Protective Search)

• It was not error to deny motion to suppress on claim second pat-down search of def was invalid, where def's behavior became increasingly suspicious after the first pat-down search; def gave officer false and contradictory answers to his questions; def could not tell officer where he was staying, or offer a consistent explanation for why he was in the area; when asked where he was living, def led officer to a vacant lot; and def lied about having never been arrested in Amarillo. Evid supported ruling that it was reasonable for officer to infer from def's inconsistent statements that def might be type of person who would conceal a weapon. This is so even though officer had already conducted one pat-down search of def. Def's behavior after first search heightened officer's suspicions and led him to the reasonable belief that def might be presently armed and dangerous. Balentine v State (April 3, 2002, No. 73,490)

• It was not error to deny motion to suppress on claim pat-down search exceeded permissible scope. When officer patted down the outside of def's front pants pocket, he felt what he thought was a weapon. In order to ascertain whether the object was in fact a weapon, officer reached into def's pocket. That in the course of doing so officer discovered an object he immediately recognized by touch as a bullet did not render the search unreasonable. Officer's search did not exceed the scope of that which was necessary to determine whether def was armed. Balentine v State (April 3, 2002, No. 73,490)

not lawful protective search (Protective Search)

• Protective sweep in def’s home was illegal, where officer did not express his belief that any third persons were inside def’s home, nor did he articulate his belief that a third person inside the home was attempting to jeopardize either his or the public’s safety. In fact, officer specifically stated that he considered def’s driveway a safe place for both him, his fellow officers and def. Since officer failed to express a single articulable fact necessitating a protective sweep, the sweep was illegal. Reasor v State, 12 S.W.3d 813 (Mar. 1, 2000)

harmless (Illegal Search & Seizure & Harmless Error Doctrine)

• Def was not harmed by denial of motion to suppress where only item obtained in the complained-of search and admitted into evidence at trial was some yellow wire taken from def’s automobile. The victim in the instant case was strangled with yellow wire that was left wrapped and tangled around her neck and shoulder, but testimony showed that the wire found in def’s vehicle was not the same gauge as that found on the victim; other testimony unrelated to the search revealed that def had access to the exact type of wire used to murder the victim; and various witnesses described def and his vehicle, and noted def and his vehicle were by the victim’s home the morning of the murder, the victim had skin and blood under her fingernails, def had what appeared to be fresh scratch wounds on his face and chest, and tests established that def’s DNA matched that of sperm recovered from the victim and her clothing. The error, if any, did not influence the jury’s deliberations to def’s detriment or had but slight effect. Ibarra v State, 11 S.W.3d 189 (Oct. 20, 1999)