This page of Baker's Legal Pages contains casenotes from recent decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. This information is made available as a free public service for your personal, non-commercial use. While every effort has been made to provide accurate material at this site, it is provided "as is" and no representations are made that it is free of mistakes or inaccuracies. If you inform me of any mistake or inaccuracy that you find here, I will make every effort to determine what corrections are required and to make those changes.

Below are casenotes from recent opinions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, supplementing Baker's Texas Criminal Evidence Handbook. Each casenote is linked to the text of the opinion from which it was derived.

For links to other casesnote pages supplementing Baker's Texas Criminal Evidence Handbook, see the Criminal Evidence Handbook Casenotes Listing.

For links to casesnote pages for other handbooks, see the Main Casenotes Listing.

If you already know the name of a particular recent case of interest, you may go directly to that opinion from the Table of Recent Opinions.

notes (Texas Const. on Arrest without Warrant)

• Def's rights under Art. I, Sec. 9, Texas Constitution, were not violated when peace officer went to the aid of a motorist (def) who was unconscious in his vehicle on a public highway. Hulit v State, 982 S.W.2d 431 (Dec. 16, 1998)

• Art. I, Sec. 9, Texas Const., comprises two, independent clauses. The first recognizes the right to be free from unreasonable seizures or searches. The second imposes limits on warrants. Neither clause requires a warrant or even authorizes a warrant. The warrant clause does not say when a warrant must issue, or when it may issue; it says only when warrants may not issue. It is cast in the negative (“no warrant … shall issue”). And even if a warrant met the minimum requirements of the warrant clause (description, probable cause, and affidavit), the warrant still would be unlawful if the seizure or search that it authorized were unreasonable. The warrant clause in Section 9 does not mean that a warrant is indispensable to a valid search and seizure. Hulit v State, 982 S.W.2d 431 (Dec. 16, 1998)

• Because of the similarities of the search and seizure provisions in the state and federal constitutions, United States Supreme Court cases may be permissive authority in interpreting the Texas Constitution. Hulit v State, 982 S.W.2d 431 (Dec. 16, 1998)

• Art. I, Sec. 9, Texas Constitution, contains no requirement that a seizure or search be authorized by a warrant. A seizure or search that is otherwise reasonable will not be found to be in violation of that section because it was not authorized by a warrant. (This is not to say that statutes which require warrants for seizure or search may be ignored, nor that the issuance of a warrant by a neutral magistrate may not be a factor in the totality of circumstances by which to judge whether a seizure or search was reasonable.) Hulit v State, 982 S.W.2d 431 (Dec. 16, 1998)

• Art. I, Sec. 9, Texas Const., does not offer greater protection to the individual than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and it may offer less protection. Hulit v State, 982 S.W.2d 431 (Dec. 16, 1998)

• Police officers acted reasonably when they approached the vehicle in which def was slumped unconscious on a public highway, awakened him, and asked him to step out so they could see if he was in need of assistance. Art. I, Sec. 9, Texas Constitution, was not violated by their actions. From the totality of the circumstances, after considering the public and private interests that are at stake, their action was not an unreasonable seizure. Hulit v State, 982 S.W.2d 431 (Dec. 16, 1998)

notes (Cases on Approach)

• A police officer does not need reasonable suspicion before he talks to a person in a public place or knocks on a person's door. No merit to contention that facts in instant case constituted a detention, not an encounter, so reasonable suspicion was required. At first, officer merely slowed down his vehicle to get a closer look at def. This was at most an encounter. When def ran to his apartment, officer followed him and knocked on the door. This, too, was simply an encounter. Reasonable suspicion was not required for either encounter. State v Perez (September 25, 2002, No. 2127-01)

• There are three recognized categories of interaction between the police and citizens: encounters, investigative detentions and arrests. To engage in an encounter with a citizen, an officer need not show any particular level of suspicion because the citizen is not under any obligation to continue speaking with the officer. However, both an investigative detention and an arrest involve a seizure of the citizen. Therefore, a certain objective level of suspicion must be shown by the officer to justify the seizure. If the interaction involves an investigative detention, the officer must show reasonable suspicion that the citizen is connected to criminal activity. If the interaction is an arrest, the officer must show probable cause to believe that the citizen has engaged in or is engaging in criminal activity. State v Larue (October 4, 2000, Nos. 37-00 & 38-00)

stop & detention (Cases on Stop & Detention)

• State law, Parks & Wild. Code sec. 31.124(a), providing that an officer may stop and board a boat in order to perform a water safety check, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, is constitutional. The state has a high interest in promoting recreational water safety; that interest can be realistically promoted only through random water safety checks. In contrast, the level of intrusion involved is minimal. Checkpoints are not a practical alternative on the water, and while any show of authority can be unsettling and inconvenient, here the stop involves a brief inspection, not a full-blown search of the boat or driver. The intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights is minimal. Schenekl v State (October 25, 2000, No. 1529-99)

facts showed no detention (Cases on Stop & Detention)

• A police officer does not need reasonable suspicion before he talks to a person in a public place or knocks on a person's door. No merit to contention that facts in instant case constituted a detention, not an encounter, so reasonable suspicion was required. At first, officer merely slowed down his vehicle to get a closer look at def. This was at most an encounter. When def ran to his apartment, officer followed him and knocked on the door. This, too, was simply an encounter. Reasonable suspicion was not required for either encounter. State v Perez (September 25, 2002, No. 2127-01)

basis for stop (Cases on Stop & Detention)

• An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. A reasonable-suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Ford v State (March 9, 2005, No. PD-1946-03)

• "Reasonable suspicion" exists if the officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity. This standard is an objective one: there need only be an objective basis for the stop; the subjective intent of the officer conducting the stop is irrelevant. The reasonable suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. A bifurcated standard or review is used in making this totality of the circumstances determination: (1) giving almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts and application of law to fact questions that turn on credibility and demeanor, and (2) reviewing de novo application of law to fact questions that do not turn upon credibility and demeanor. Garcia v State (April 18, 2001, No. 2057-99)

• Where car in which def was a passenger was stopped, not because of any evidence of criminal activity, but out of concern for def's health, court must determine if officer acted reasonably when he stopped the vehicle out of concern for the welfare of def when he observed him leaning out the open rear window and vomiting at 4:00 a.m. Cause remanded to court of appeals for determination. Wright v State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Dec. 15, 1999)

• Police officers do much more than enforce the law, conduct investigations, and gather evidence to be used in criminal proceedings. Part of their job is to investigate accidents (where there is often no claim of criminal liability), to direct traffic and to perform other duties that can be best described as "community caretaking functions." As part of his duty to "serve and protect," a police officer may stop and assist an individual whom a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would believe is in need of help. In determining whether a police officer acted reasonably in stopping an individual to determine if he needs assistance, the following factors (among others) are relevant to that determination: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance independent of that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others. Wright v State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Dec. 15, 1999)

• Court made no distinction in the applicability of the community caretaking function to vehicle stops to determine the welfare of passengers as opposed to drivers. Wright v State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Dec. 15, 1999)

• Vehicle stops under community caretaking function has narrow applicability. Only in the most unusual circumstances will warrantless searches of private, fixed property, or stops of persons located thereon, be justified under the community caretaking function, given the greater expectation of privacy inherent with respect to residences and other private real property. Wright v State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Dec. 15, 1999)

traffic stop (Cases on Stop & Detention)

• In deciding whether the scope of a Terry detention is "reasonable," the general rule is that an investigative stop can last no longer than necessary to effect the purpose of the stop. In other words, if a driver is stopped on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, once the officer determines that the driver is not impaired, he should be promptly released. However, there is an additional component to a routine traffic stop - the license and warrants check. On a routine traffic stop, officers may request certain information from a driver, such as a driver's license and car registration, and may conduct a computer check on that information. It is only after this computer check is completed, and the officer knows that this driver has a currently valid license, no outstanding warrants, and the car is not stolen, that the traffic-stop investigation is fully resolved. Kothe v State (October 20, 2004, No. PD-1738-03)

• Because reasonable suspicion is an objective determination, officer's motives for conducting traffic stop are irrelevant to the validity of the stop. Garcia v State (April 18, 2001, No. 2057-99)

• State need not establish with absolute certainty that a crime has occurred in order to show reasonable suspicion for traffic stop, but it is required to elicit testimony of sufficient facts to create a reasonable suspicion. Garcia v State (April 18, 2001, No. 2057-99)

• During a routine traffic stop, an officer is permitted to detain the individual in order to check for outstanding warrants. Walter v State (September 20, 2000, No. 1321-99)

duration of stop (Cases on Stop & Detention)

• It was error to grant motion to suppress, and duration of continued detention following DWI investigation was not unreasonable, where officer determined def was not intoxicated but detention was extended while officer ran license check. In instant case there is no evidence or even suggestion that officer failed to diligently pursue his investigation, nor was there any evidence that he ran the license check as a pretext to investigate an unrelated crime for which he had no reasonable suspicion. There was no suggestion that he engaged in any "fishing expedition." Viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to the trial court's factual findings, the officer's decision to return to his vehicle and simply wait a few minutes for the warrant-check results before releasing def was "reasonable" as a matter of substantive Fourth Amendment law. Also, evid did not show officer acted unreasonably in not releasing def after receiving info from license check that def had no outstanding warrants, and before receiving second dispatch that indicated def might have bank bag containing missing property, which prompted officer to request consent to search car, which def granted. It appeared that officer received the second dispatch, if not before completing the warrant check, almost instantaneously with it, and there was no testimony or insinuation that the officer was purposefully prolonging def's detention. The officer's actions were "reasonable" under the circumstances, and the detention as a whole was "reasonable." Since neither the initial stop nor its duration violated the Fourth Amendment, def's consent to search his car was not unconstitutionally tainted. Kothe v State (October 20, 2004, No. PD-1738-03)

• It was not error to deny motion to suppress on claim length of detention was unreasonable. Officer initially stopped def to learn his identity and to determine if he was involved in reported gunfire; officer's questioning lasted no longer than was necessary to effectuate this purpose. In instant case, amount of time necessary to question def about his possible involvement in report of shots fired increased substantially because of def's evasive answers, and not because of some dilatory tactic on officer's part. Balentine v State (April 3, 2002, No. 73,490)

lawful stop: investigation of reported crime: vehicle (Cases on Stop & Detention)

• Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop def's car where he acted on info from dispatcher, which was received from citizen who gave a detailed description of def's car and location, as well as his erratic driving; as requested by the 911 dispatcher, the citizen followed behind def with her emergency lights on, which assisted the officer in identifying the proper vehicle; throughout the incident, the citizen kept in contact with the 911 dispatcher, and she remained at the scene after def's car was stopped by police; there, she provided police with her contact information; she later appeared as a witness at the suppression hearing, and she testified about her firsthand observations. Relying on the information supplied by the citizen, the officer testified he was able to locate and identify def's vehicle and that the facts relayed to him through the 911 dispatcher caused him to believe that def was driving while intoxicated. No merit to def's contention officer must personally witness facts giving rise to criminal activity. Brother v State (June 29, 2005, No. PD-1820-02)

lawful stop: suspicion of drug offense: informant tip (Cases on Stop & Detention)

• Warrantless stop of def's car was constitutionally justified based upon the informant’s tip that def was transporting cocaine, her previous history of providing reliable information to authorities and the events at gas station that corroborated her information. No merit to def's contention that the informant’s descriptions (that def was a black male with “sleepy” looking eyes and that he would be driving a rental car of an unknown make) were too vague to justify a stop. While the informant’s description of def by itself was imprecise, all of the surrounding circumstances, taken together, justified the stop. The fact that the informant provided reliable information in the past, arrived at the time and place she had indicated and was accompanied by an individual matching the description she had given police, provided the officers with sufficient corroborating evidence to give rise to “reasonable suspicion” of def under Terry. Carmouche v State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Jan. 26, 2000)

lawful stop: suspicion of other criminal activity: pedestrian (Cases on Stop & Detention)

• It was not error to deny motion to suppress on claim officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain def, where shortly after arriving on the scene of a shots-fired call, officer observed def walking across the street nearby the complainant's residence; it was approximately 2:30 in the morning in what officer described as a residential, low-traffic area; def appeared nervous and was walking briskly away from the reported direction of the gunfire while constantly looking back over his shoulder in officer's direction. Officer was able to point to specific articulable facts that led him to conclude def was or would soon be engaged in criminal activity. Balentine v State (April 3, 2002, No. 73,490)

unlawful stop: traffic stop (Cases on Stop & Detention)

• It was not abuse of discretion for trial court to grant def's motion to suppress. It was within the discretion of the trial judge to decide whether to believe the officers' claim that they pulled def over for a traffic offense. The trial judge made it clear that he believed the turns made by def were lawful, so no traffic violation was committed and the stop was not valid. Because the trial court did not believe that an offense had occurred, the evidence was obtained as a result of an unlawful stop. The record supported trial court's conclusion that the search was not conducted pursuant to a valid traffic stop, and the evidence was properly suppressed. State v Dixon (February 15, 2006, No. PD-0077-05)

• It was error to deny motion to suppress where record did not show specific, articulable facts to support officer's conclusion that def failed to maintain a proper distance, so was no basis for initial detention. Officer's testimony* presented only a conclusory statement that def was violating a traffic law, following too close. Ford v State (March 9, 2005, No. PD-1946-03)

• Testimony* of officer, that child-passenger in car def was driving looked back several times, did not provide reasonable suspicion that child was not wearing seat belt, and did not authorize traffic stop. Officer testified only that child looked back several times. Officer's testimony that from this he concluded child may not have ben wearing a seat belt could simply reflect officer’s mistaken belief that a certain fact possesses a tendency to create reasonable suspicion. Determining what circumstances give rise to reasonable suspicion, however, is something that appellate courts ultimately must do: "the legal rules for probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application. Independent review is therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify the legal principles." Hence, appeals court refused to use officer's legal conclusion that a seat belt violation may have occurred to imply more than what his testimony revealed: that the child looked back several times. Garcia v State (April 18, 2001, No. 2057-99)