This page of Baker's Legal Pages contains casenotes from recent decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. This information is made available as a free public service for your personal, non-commercial use. While every effort has been made to provide accurate material at this site, it is provided "as is" and no representations are made that it is free of mistakes or inaccuracies. If you inform me of any mistake or inaccuracy that you find here, I will make every effort to determine what corrections are required and to make those changes.

Below are casenotes from recent opinions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, supplementing Baker's Texas Criminal Evidence Handbook. Each casenote is linked to the text of the opinion from which it was derived.

For links to other casesnote pages supplementing Baker's Texas Criminal Evidence Handbook, see the Criminal Evidence Handbook Casenotes Listing.

For links to casesnote pages for other handbooks, see the Main Casenotes Listing.

If you already know the name of a particular recent case of interest, you may go directly to that opinion from the Table of Recent Opinions.

arrest lawful: drug offense tip (CCP Art. 14.01. Offense Within View)

• Arrest was lawful under 14.01(b) where informant approached officer and relayed information about criminal activity he had witnessed; informant provided officer with detailed description of def and told officer def could be found on certain street corner; informant also provided def's name and name of one of his two companions; informant was concerned that def was selling crack cocaine in the area and that he was hiding the cocaine between his buttocks. Based on this tip, officer proceeded to named street corner and saw that a person standing there [def] matched description provided by informant. Officer then asked for identification and names matched those provided by informant. He observed marijuana smoke in the air above def and a marijuana cigarette on the ground next to him, and also smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from def. The cloud of marijuana smoke in the air, the smell of marijuana, and the marijuana cigarette were consistent with the offense of possession of marijuana. When coupled with officer's prior knowledge supplied by the informant, the observations were sufficient to provide probable cause to arrest under 14.01(b). McGee v State (April 23, 2003, No. 1408-00)

arrest lawful: traffic offenses (CCP Art. 14.01. Offense Within View)

• It was not error to deny motion to suppress evid seized from def's vehicle, on claim it should be suppressed under 14.03(d) as fruit of illegal traffic stop outside city police officers' geographic jurisdiction, where trial court could have determined from evid in case that traffic stop was lawful under 14.01(b). Trial court could have concluded city officers were acting on instruction of deputy sheriff to stop vehicle for traffic violation observed by deputy; deputy was in continuous radio contact with city officers and arrived at scene a few minutes after def was stopped. Stop was in deputy's geographic jurisdiction and city officers' geographic jurisdiction was irrelevant to issue. Armendariz v State (December 10, 2003, No. 0070-02)

arrest unlawful (CCP Art. 14.01. Offense Within View)

• It was not error to grant def's motion to suppress evid seized under warrantless arrest and search of residence, where officers acted on anonymous tip that someone at residence was selling drugs and odor of marihuana coming from house when def opened door for officers. This did not give probable cause for officers to believe def was committing offense of possession of marihuana in their presence. Officers had no idea who was smoking or possessing marijuana, and had no particular reason to believe that def was smoking or possessing marijuana. State v Steelman (October 23, 2002, Nos. 1022-00 & 1023-00)

construction (CCP Art. 14.03. Authority of Peace Officer)

• Article 14.03(a)(1) authorizes the warrantless arrest of a person found in a suspicious place and under circumstances which reasonably show that an offense has been or is about to be committed. Any "place" may become suspicious when a person at that location and the accompanying circumstances raise a reasonable belief that the person has committed a crime and exigent circumstances call for immediate action or detention by police. Swain v State (November 2, 2005, No. AP-74,854)

• An officer of the police department of a city does not have authority to stop a person for committing a traffic offense when the officer is in another city within the same county. State v Kurtz (October 20, 2004, No. PD-1397-03)

• The determination of whether a place is a "suspicious place" is a highly fact-specific analysis. Review of case law indicates several different factors have been used to justify determination of a place as suspicious, but only one factor seems to be constant throughout the case law: The time frame between the crime and the apprehension of a suspect in a suspicious place is short. In instant case, court did not set any specific time limits, but pointed out that the time between the crime and the apprehension of the suspect in a suspicious place is an important factor. Dyar v State (April 23, 2003, No. 1794-01)

• Test under 14.03(a)(1) is a totality of the circumstances test. First, probable cause that the defendant committed a crime must be found and second, the defendant must be found in a "suspicious place." Dyar v State (April 23, 2003, No. 1794-01)

arrest lawful under 14.03 (CCP Art. 14.03. Authority of Peace Officer)

• It was not error to admit def's statements over claim they were fruit of illegal arrest, where if arrest occurred at time def claimed, it was authorized by 14.01(a)(3). Circumstances reasonably showed an offense had been committed; def was driver of a truck parked near crime scene on night victim disappeared; def admitted that he and X broke into a house and that X beat the female homeowner. Exigent circumstances arose when def stated that he and X left the beaten victim alive at a remote location. Officer testified that his "biggest concern at that point in time was to go find [victim]," and further testified: "Obviously, based on that [statement], at that point in time, me not knowing whether or not I had a dead woman or not, I couldn't tell that from the crime scene, it was imperative that we find where this woman was possibly for her life." Second officer testified that he thought def might attempt to flee. Given def's nervous behavior and his admission that he had been involved in a crime, it was reasonable to believe that def would not remain at interrogation scene if the officers left to obtain a warrant. Swain v State (November 2, 2005, No. AP-74,854)

• No merit to contention city police officer lacked authority to stop def's car because he was outside his jurisdiction, where officer had authority under 14.03(g) and 14.03(d) when he stopped def based on probable cause to believe DWI was underway. Brother v State (June 29, 2005, No. PD-1820-02)

• Def's warrantless arrest was lawful under 14.05(1) and 14.03(a)(1) where record* supported finding that (1) def consented to police entry to his home, (2) def's home was a "suspicious place" where he was arrested there for DWI soon after he walked there after abandoning his wrecked truck at scene of an accident, and (3) those circs raised a reasonable belief that def had committed a breach of the peace and that exigent circumstances (the need to ascertain def's blood-alcohol level) existed to justify def's immediate arrest. Gallups v State (December 8, 2004, No. PD-0897-03)

• It was not error to deny motion to suppress def's statements to police, over objection they were product of unlawful arrest, where warrantless arrest was authorized under 14.03(a)(4), in light of signed, handwritten note found at murder scene coupled with police knowledge of def's name and his relationship with victims and other circs present at crime scene, which linked def to murders. Jackson v State (December 13, 2000, No. 73,033)

arrest lawful: suspicious place (CCP Art. 14.03. Authority of Peace Officer)

• Warrantless arrest was lawful under 14.03(a)(1) where def was arrested at hospital where he had been taken after accident and before officers arrived at scene of accident. No merit to contention hospital was not a suspicious place under 14.03(a)(1), where officer arrived at scene of accident and was informed that driver was taken to hospital; this information would tend to make a hospital a suspicious place in which to seek the driver who was suspected of causing the accident. At the hospital, soon after the accident, officer observed that def had slurred speech, red glassy eyes, a strong smell of alcohol and that many of def's answers were unintelligible; def also admitted to drinking and driving. Those facts in relation to the hospital make the hospital a "suspicious place." Those same facts also provided probable cause to believe that def had been drinking and driving. Dyar v State (April 23, 2003, No. 1794-01)

arrest lawful under 14.04 (CCP Art. 14.04. When Felony Has Been Committed)

• It was not error to deny motion to suppress evid seized from def, over contention it was product of illegal arrest, where arrest was lawful under 14.04. Considering the circumstances as a whole, police had satisfactory proof to believe that the occupants of the car they were pursuing had just committed a double murder/robbery and that their escape was imminent. The warrantless arrest of appellant was justified, and the trial court judge correctly denied def's motion to suppress. Facts of case demonstrated there was satisfactory proof that a crime had been committed and that the individuals arrested shortly after the crime occurred were responsible. (The theater where the crime occurred had experienced a rash of robberies and burglaries in the recent past, and law enforcement officers had staked out the area with specific hopes of catching those responsible. During the evening in question, undercover officers noticed def and his partner as the two walked through the parking lot toward the theater building. Approximately ten minutes later, both men were observed walking quickly back toward their car. Def was twenty to thirty feet behind his partner, who appeared to be hunched over, concealing what was described as a "large bulge" beneath his shirt. This "bulge" had not been observed earlier. After both men entered the car, the driver, who had never left the vehicle, quickly accelerated, exiting the parking lot at a high rate of speed, and continued onto the highway reaching speeds of ninety miles an hour. To the undercover officers, these actions, under the existing circumstances, indicated the two men may have just burglarized a parked motor vehicle. One officer, in an unmarked vehicle, began a clandestine pursuit, maintaining a safe distance so as not to arouse the suspect's suspicion. The officers remaining at the theater searched the parking lot for signs of a possible burglary. Within minutes, theater patrons came upon the two victims, both apparently dead of gunshot wounds. Authorities were notified, and the occupants of the fleeing car then became capital murder suspects. By viewing the totality of the circumstances, there was satisfactory proof that a crime had been committed and the occupants of the fleeing car were responsible.) Hughes v State, 24 S.W.3d 833 (Apr. 12, 2000)

• Arrest without warrant was lawful under 14.04 where evid available to police showed def had fled crime scene in surviving victim’s pickup truck. Officer had satisfactory proof that def had committed a felony and had already fled the scene of the crime. This was satisfactory proof that def was about to escape. Busby v State, 990 S.W.2d 263 (March 31, 1999)

arrest lawful: about to escape (CCP Art. 14.04. When Felony Has Been Committed)

• It was not error to deny motion to suppress evid seized from def, over contention it was product of illegal arrest, where arrest was lawful under 14.04. Considering the circumstances as a whole, police had satisfactory proof to believe that the occupants of the car they were pursuing had just committed a double murder/robbery and that their escape was imminent. The warrantless arrest of appellant was justified, and the trial court judge correctly denied def's motion to suppress. Record showed satisfactory proof that def was about to escape and there was insufficient opportunity to obtain an arrest warrant. (Information of the crime and its possible suspects was immediately dispatched over the police radio. The undercover officer kept the speeding fleeing car within his sight until a marked police unit intervened and occupied a position directly behind, and within obvious view of, the fleeing vehicle. The officer did not, however, activate the unit's emergency lights at this time. The suspect vehicle eventually exited the highway and pulled into a gas station in south Dallas. Def exited and appeared as though he was preparing to activate the gas pump. The pursuing unit pulled in behind the suspect vehicle, activated its emergency lights, and, almost immediately, other marked units converged on the scene. Def was ordered onto the ground and arrested. The remaining occupants of the car were ordered to exit the vehicle, and they, too, were placed under arrest. The proximity in time between commission of the crime and arrest along with discovery of pursuit, while not individually dispositive, are relevant factors to determine whether escape was imminent. Police linked the occupants of the car with the crime only minutes after its commission and initiated a necessary pursuit as the occupants demonstrated their desire to quickly distance themselves from the crime scene. Def was highly mobile and could have easily escaped detection had police not intervened. It would have been unreasonable to break pursuit, abandon the fresh trail of a recently committed crime, and force police to acquire an arrest warrant in hopes of encountering the car and its occupants at some later time. Additional consideration can be given to the geographic location of def's arrest. Circumstances dictated that police officers act expeditiously to apprehend what they reasonably believed were violent suspects who, at the time, occupied a public street as opposed to a private residence.) Hughes v State, 24 S.W.3d 833 (Apr. 12, 2000)

notes (CCP Art. 14.05. Rights of Officer)

• Def's warrantless arrest was lawful under 14.05(1) and 14.03(a)(1) where record* supported finding that (1) def consented to police entry to his home, (2) def's home was a "suspicious place" where he was arrested there for DWI soon after he walked there after abandoning his wrecked truck at scene of an accident, and (3) those circs raised a reasonable belief that def had committed a breach of the peace and that exigent circumstances (the need to ascertain def's blood-alcohol level) existed to justify def's immediate arrest. Gallups v State (December 8, 2004, No. PD-0897-03)